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RECENT CASES
TAX AND INSURANCE ESCROW ACCOUNTS IN
MORTGAGES-THE ATTACK PRESSES ON
Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n'
Several lending institutions in and around Pittsburg, Pennsylvania,
financed the residential borrowing of various homeowners who had ex-
ecuted mortgages and accompanying personal bonds as security for the
loans. Along with the normal principal and interest payments, the mort-
gagees required one-twelfth of the amount of the annual property taxes
and casualty insurance premiums to be deposited monthly with the mort-
gagees in escrow accounts.2 The lending institutions paid these assessments
from the accumulated funds as they became due. The institutions com-
mingled the mortgage escrow funds with general funds and invested them
for their own profit, but did not pay the depositors for the use of the
funds.3 Twenty-nine individuals brought a class action against these
institutions to recover the profits derived from the investment of such
funds by the institutions.4 The trial court sustained the defendants' joint
demurrer and dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of
action. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
mortgagors' allegations of misuse of the escrow funds by the mortgagees
stated a cause of action for breach of an express trust, imposition of a
constructive trust, and breach of an implied contract,5 and remanded for a
trial on the merits.
The most common 6 method of challenging the legality of non-interest
1. 457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974). See generally Comment, Lender Ac-
countability and the Problem of Noninterest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts,
54 B.U.L. REv. 516 (1974).
2. The origin of these payments dates back to the 1930's when the financial
situation of thousands of people made this type of account the easiest and most
convenient method of paying the taxes and insurance on their mortgaged property.
At the same time these payments protected the lending institutions against tax
liens which would take priority over the mortgages. See, e.g., CONSUMER REP.,
March 1973, at 202; Hearings on H.R. 13337 Before a Subcomm. on Housing of
the House Committde of Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 322-23(1972); 4 Amsc.AN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.1061 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). See also
Comment, Payment of Interest on Mortgage Escrow Accounts: Judicial and Legis-
lative Developments, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 845 (1972).
3. The most recent estimate of annual lost interest income to consumers
amounts to over $235,000,000. Total escrow account collections themselves amount
to $9.4 billion annually. United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Study
of the Feasibility of Escrow Accounts on Residential Mortgages Becoming Interest
Bearing 7 (1973).
4. Consumer protection groups have become very involved in this area of
home financing. Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
5. '457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974).
6. Many other theories have been advanced, without success. See, e.g.,
Graybeal v. American Say. &c Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1973) (breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, usury, truth in lending, antitrust, fraud, breach of
trust); Vmdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D.
Okla. 1973) (breach of trust, unjust enrichment, truth in lending, antitrust);
Stavrides v. Mellon Natn1 Bank &c Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd
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bearing escrow accounts is the breach of trust theory.7 The, first appellate
consideration of this theory was in Sears v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n.8 The plaintiffs contended that their monthly prepayments were
deposits to be used for a specific purpose and were therefore sufficient
to establish a trust relationship. The court disagreed, perhaps confusing
the requirements of a deposit for a specific purpose with those of a special
deposit.9 The court held that the monthly payments gave rise only to a
debtor-creditor relationship, not a trust. It is to be noted that the Sears
decision was based on the court's interpretation of the specific mortgage in-
strument in issue. A major portion of the court's opinion centered on
the instrument's express language relating to the monthly prepayments.
The form used contained three possible wordings, of which one was to
be selected at the option of the lending institution. The language actually
chosen was in contrast to specific trust language contained in another of
the available options.10 Further construction of the agreement's language
led the court to regard the deposits as being pledged against the main
indebtedness; that is, the escrow funds were construed merely to represent
payments on a debt owed to the institution. The exact language of the
contract, as alleged in the complaint, proved to be a bar to the plaintiffs'
recovery.
Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank" went a step further
than Sears by "recognizing the special purpose nature of these prepayments
[tax-escrow funds] and the resulting trust relationship."' 2 Carpenter was
the first appellate decision to hold that the mortgagor's trust theory
stated a cause of action.' 3 Unlike Sears, the Carpenter decision was not
per curiam, 487 F.2d 953 (Sd Cir. 1973) (antitrust, truth in lending, usury, unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty).
7. The payments are considered as creating a trust relationship between
mortgagor and mortgagee under this theory. Ulbrict, Impound Accounts and After,
28 Bus. LAw. 203 (1972).
8. 1 Ill. App. 5d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300 (1971).
9. .Specific property deposited with a bank and earmarked for exact return
is a special deposit. The relationship created is one of bailor-bailee. A deposit for
a special purpose requires only that the designated purpose of the deposit be
strictly adhered to by the bank and a trust is thereby created. Annot., 31 A.L.R.
472 (1924); cf. 5 A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 530 (3d ed. 1967). The Sears
court believed that the payments must be segregated and earmarked before a
trust could arise. However, these are not requirements for a special purpose deposit.
See Comment, The Attack Upon the Tax and Insurance Escrow Accounts in
Mortgages, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 353-58 (1974).
10. The options in regard to the escrow payments were that they: (1) be held
in trust by it without earnings for the payment of such items; (2) be carried in a
borrower's tax and insurance account and withdrawn by the lender to pay such
item; or (3) be credited to the unpaid balance of said indebtedness as received.
11. Mass. .-, 291 N.E.2d 609 (1973).
12. Comment, supra note 9, at 359.
13. Only a New York Small Claims Court has gone farther. It allowed a
mortgagor to recover profits derived from the investment of the escrow funds on
a breach of fiduciary duty theory. Tierney v. Whitesone Sav. 8: Loan Assn, 353
N.Y.S.2d 104, 75 Misc. 2d 284 (Small Claims Ct. 1974).
[Vol. 41
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 19
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/19
RECENT CASES -
based on an interpretation of the specific language of the mortgage and
loan agreements in question. The language of these instruments was
not specifically set forth in the pleadings and therefore was not before
the court.' 4 The allegations pertinent to the decision set forth only that
the mortgagors made monthly payments into escrow in order to pay their
property taxes, that the bank commingled the funds with its own resources,
invested the funds for a profit, and refused to render these earnings to the
mortgagors. 15
To support its holding, the Carpenter court relied on two lines of trust
theory: the so-called "ABC" case and two special deposit cases. The former
analysis is based on the decision of In Re Interborough Consolidated Corp.G
In that case the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said
that when A gave money to B to be delivered to C, a trust arose in favor
of C.17 Under the facts of Carpenter, A is the mortgagor and B the lending
institution which pays the taxes to the city, C. If the bank refused to remit
the mortgagor's tax payments to the city, the "ABC" theory would allow
the city to sue the bank for a breach of trust.1 8 However, the primary
function of this theory is to protect creditors from middlemen, not to
allow mortgagors to recover the profits derived from a mortgagee's wrong-
ful use of escrow funds.19
The second theory involves the creation of a trust relationship through
the existence of special deposits. This relationship arises when money is
deposited with a bank to be held by it separate from its own assets. 20
But the bankruptcy cases relied on in Carpenter in support of this theory
are of doubtful precedential value. The imposition of a trust to preserve
a special depositor's rights against unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy
case does not, a priori, support the finding of a trust where mortgagors
are seeking an accounting of profits from mortgagees.2 '
Surprisingly, the Carpenter court did not indicate the specific form of
trust that may have been created. This is in contrast to the distinction
between express and implied trusts made by the Sears court. There it
was held that no express trust could arise, because of the nature of the
express language of the agreements. The Sears court proclaimed:
Although the term "implied trust" has been used to designate
an express trust arising from the construction of language in a
document, it seems to us that it is preferable to define the trust
which would arise in such situations as an express trust.22
14. - Mass. at -, 291 N.E.2d at 611.
15. Id. at -, 291 N.E.2d at 613-14.
16. 288 F. 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 752 (1923).
17. Id. at 347, citing McKee v. Lamon, 159 U.S. 317, 322 (1895).
18. Comment, supra note 1, at 522-23.
19. Id. at 521-22.
20. 5 A. Scorr, THE LAiw oF TRUSTS § 530 (3d ed. 1967).
21. Comment, supra note 1, at 522.
22. 1 IIl. App. 3d at 627, 275 N.E.2d at 303.
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Because the complaint before the Carpenter court did not assert the
express language of the agreement, the trust in issue should have been
considered an implied trust.
It has been suggested that a resulting trust most properly conforms
to the facts of Carpenter.2 3 This is a logical position, even though none
of the three traditional classes of resulting trusts is precisely applicable. 24
In contrast to an express trust, which is created by the settlor's external
expression of intention, a resulting trust exists if the circumstances
show an absence of intention on the part of a transferor to give the
beneficial interest in property to one who has received legal title.25
In the tax escrow account area, it can be argued that the mortgagor did
not intend to allow the lending institutions the beneficial use of his money.
Therefore, any profits derived from the use thereof should result back to
the mortgagor. The intent of the escrow payments is to protect the mort-
gagee's security interest, not to increase his income.
The Carpenter court noted that the intention of the parties deter-
mines the existence of a trust. 26 However, Carpenter did not consider the
merits of a constructive trust theory. Unlike an express trust or resulting
trust, a constructive trust is remedial in nature. 17 A creature of equity,
a constructive trust does not arise by virtue of agreement or intention.28
23. A resulting trust theory may provide a tactical advantage to the class
action lawsuit which typifies tax escrow account litigation. As the circumstances
surrounding the payments are instrumental in the determination of the mortga-
gor's intention and therefore the applicability of a resulting trust, the similarity of
circumstances arising from the dealings of one lending institution facilitates the
class treatment. A constructive trust theory has similar advantages. As an advo-
cate of the resulting trust theory, one has several possible contentions. He can
point to the limited purpose of the escrow payments and to other factors leading
to a strong inference that the mortgagor intended to keep the beneficial in-
erest in his tax payments. "The mortgagor could require the bank to rebut this
inference by showing, perhaps, that it was the bank's policy and practice to raise
this matter routinely with prospective mortgagors. If the bank cannot demonstrate
that its usual practice was to inform borrowers that they would not receive any
interest or earnings from the bank's investment of their tax excrow payments, it
will be difficult for the bank to argue effectively against the finding of a result-
ing trust." Without such disclosure it will be difficult to prove that the mortgagors
desired to give away any beneficial interest in their payments to the mortgagee.
Comment, supra note 1, at 528-29.
24. Traditionally, resulting trusts have been found where an express trust
fails, where an express trust is fully performed and there remains a surplus in the
trust estate, and where property is purchased with funds supplied by A, but legal
title is transfered to B. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS ,§ 411, 430, 440
(1959). The last kind of resulting trust is commonly called a "purchase money
resulting trust." See G. & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRusTs AND TRUSTEES § 454
(3d ed. 1964). It has been suggested that the only traditional resulting trust similar
to that which may exist in Carpenter is the purchase money resulting trust. See
Comment, supra note 1, at 525-29.
25. 5 A. Scorr, supra note 20, § 404.1.
26. - Mass. at - 291 N.E.2d at 614.
27. 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 139 (1955).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS ch. 12, at 326 (1959) (introductory
note to topic 1).
[V61. 41
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Buchanan marks the most significant advancement of the trust theory
by an appellate court. Only the Buchanan court treated the constructive
trust theory as stating a cause of action. Not really a legal trust at all,
a constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to prevent the unjust
enrichment of one party at the expense of another.29
In seeking the imposition of a constructive trust, the plaintiffs in
Buchanan contended that a confidential relationship arose between
themselves and the mortgagees as a result of the relative position of the
parties to the mortgage transaction. 30 As the primary basis for their cause
of action, the plaintiffs asserted that the mortgagees' retention of the
escrow fund profits had breached this confidential relationship. The
court stated that proof of the existence of a confidential relationship
is sufficient justification for imposing a constructive trust, unless the
party with the dominant position can prove "by dear and satisfactory
evidence" that the contract was not tainted by his superior bargaining
position.3S
A second theory offered by the plaintiffs in support of the imposition
of a constructive trust was based on the alleged existence of an agency
relationship between the mortgagors and mortgagees. If an agent makes
an unauthorized use of his principal's money for his own advantage, a
court may appropriately decree the equitable remedy of a constructive
trust.3 2 The court agreed with this reasoning, stating that the plaintiffs
could prevail on this theory if it could be proven on remand that the
mortgage agreement contemplated such an agency relationship.33
Unjust enrichment was the third theory proposed by the plaintiffs as
a basis for declaring the mortgagees constructive trustees of the earned
profits. In reply to this proposal, the court stated that the fundamental
question was whether "the conscience of equity" would conclude that the
mortgagees would be unjustly enriched should they be allowed to keep
the profits from the escrow funds.3 4 In general, equity will impose a con-
structive trust when property has been acquired in such circumstances that
the one who holds the legal right to the property ought not in equity and
good conscience retain the beneficial interest therein.35 It is well-settled
that this remedy will be imposed whenever justice or the need for fair
dealing warrant it.36
The dissent in Buchanan believed that the complaint did state a cause
of action on the constructive trust theory, but also said that the complaint
29. 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 139 (1955).
30. A fiduciary or confidential relationship may arise from the relative
standing of the parties to a transaction. Triesler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 817,
168 S.W.2d 1030, 1036 (1943).
31. 457 Pa. 135. , 320 A.2d 117, 127 (1974).
32. REsrATE MNT (SECOND) oF AGENCY §§ 13, 387, 388 (1958).
33. 457 Pa. at . 320 A.2d at 128.
34. Id.
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itself violated a Pennsylvania rule of civil procedure requiring a complaint
to state specifically whether any claim set forth therein is based upon a
writing.37 This objection underscores an advantage of a constructive trust
theory. The mortgage agreement itself can destroy the express trust theory
because the language of the agreement can be drafted to negate expressly
any intention to create a trust. A constructive trust is not based upon the
intent of the parties and no amount of careful draftsmanship can circum-
vent this theory.
Missouri courts have set forth standards for the imposition of a con-
structive trust applicable to mortgage escrow account litigation. It has
been held that a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists whenever
confidence is reposed by one party and the other exerts a resulting in-
fluence or superiority on the reposing party.38 The origin of this confi-
dence and its resulting influence are immaterial.39 However, there must be
evidence of some inequality, dependence, or weakness coexisting with the
granting of this confidence before a constructive trust will be imposed.40
It is of no consequence that the constructive trustee acted in good faith
or without actual intent to defraud.41
The Buchanan rationale illustrates the inherent flexibility of estab-
lished trust and constructive trust doctrines. Before relying on the Bu-
chanan case, however, a thorough examination of the mortgage agreements
in question is necessary, because mortgagors filing similar actions should
expect close judicial scrutiny of these agreements. Further decisions in
this area are likely to be on a case by case basis.
The most satisfactory remedy to the problem of tax and insurance
escrow accounts lies in recourse to the legislatures. A recent New York
statute requires the payment of interest at a rate to be established peri-
odically by a Banking Board, but in no event less than two percent per
annum. 42 Additionally, the legislation prohibits the imposition of service
charges on escrow accounts. The latter provision is a substantial victory for
the potential mortgagor entering the housing market, because the in-
creased costs of "administration" of the system may well have been passed
on to him in its absence. This "passing on" result is inherent in a Mass-
achusetts law, which requires a mortgagee to pay interest in a manner
determined by the mortgagee.48 The net effect of this latter provision may
be to require future borrowers to pay for the administrative costs incident
to the maintenance of an escrow account, a service that has traditionally
been provided free of charge. Nevertheless, resolution of the consumer's
37. 457 Pa. at - 320 A.2d at 128.
38. Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030 (1943).
39. Id. at 817, 168 S.W.2d at 1036.
40. Cohn v. Jefferson Savings and Loan Ass'n, 349 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo.
1961); Gates Hotel Co. v. C.R.H. Davis Real Estate Co., 331 Mo. 94, 52 S.W.2d
1011 (1932).
41. Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1955).
42. N.Y. B.xNG LAw § 119 (McKinney 1974).
43. MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 183, § 61 (Supp. 1974).
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